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Abstract
Background: AIDS, SARS, and the recent epidemics of the avian-flu have all served to remind us the
debate over the limits of the moral duty to care. It is important to first consider the question of whether
or not the "duty to treat" might be subject to contextual constraints. The purpose of this study was to
investigate the opinions and beliefs held by both physicians and dentists regarding the occupational risks
of infectious diseases, and to analyze the argument that the notion of "presumed consent" on the part of
professionals may be grounds for supporting the duty to treat.
Methods: For this cross-sectional survey, the study population was selected from among physicians and
dentists in Ankara. All of the 373 participants were given a self-administered questionnaire.
Results: In total, 79.6% of the participants said that they either had some degree of knowledge about the
risks when they chose their profession or that they learned of the risks later during their education and
training. Of the participants, 5.2% said that they would not have chosen this profession if they had been
informed of the risks. It was found that 57% of the participants believed that there is a standard level of
risk, and 52% of the participants stated that certain diseases would exceed the level of acceptable risk
unless specific protective measures were implemented.
Conclusion: If we use the presumed consent argument to establish the duty of the HCW to provide care,
we are confronted with problems ranging over the difficulty of choosing a profession autonomously, the
constant level of uncertainty present in the medical profession, the near-impossibility of being able to
evaluate retrospectively whether every individual was informed, and the seemingly inescapable problem
that this practice would legitimize, and perhaps even foster, discrimination against patients with certain
diseases. Our findings suggest that another problem can be added to the list: one-fifth of the participants
in this study either lacked adequate knowledge of the occupational risks when they chose the medical
profession or were not sufficiently informed of these risks during their faculty education and training.
Furthermore, in terms of the moral duty to provide care, it seems that most HCWs are more concerned
about the availability of protective measures than about whether they had been informed of a particular
risk beforehand. For all these reasons, the presumed consent argument is not persuasive enough, and
cannot be used to justify the duty to provide care. It is therefore more useful to emphasize justifications
other than presumed consent when defining the duty of HCWs to provide care, such as the social contract
between society and the medical profession and the fact that HCWs have a greater ability to provide
medical aid.
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Background
Risks and attitudes
In the course of providing health care service, health care
workers (HCWs) are continually exposed to many work-
related health risks. One of these risks is the exposure to
infectious diseases. These diseases can include the flu,
AIDS, tuberculosis, and hepatitis, and can be transmitted
through physical contact, exposure to contaminated
blood, or via the respiratory system. And, needless to say,
such risks do indeed at times prove fatal. The conse-
quences of occupational exposure to pathogens are not
limited solely to bodily infections. Each year, thousands
of HCWs are adversely affected by psychological trauma
stemming from months of anxiously awaiting the results
of serological tests, tests made necessary due to potential
infection incidents. The anxiety experienced by HCWs is
related to the perception of risk from the incident and the
resulting infection that may occur, and by the worry of
what the reactions of others might be, such as colleagues,
family, and friends, all who have to be informed. During
this uncertain waiting period HCWs will frequently expe-
rience intrusive thoughts, problems concentrating, diffi-
culty sleeping, frequent loss of temper, and a decrease in
sexual desire, which can act as a catalyst to exacerbate any
pre-existing and unresolved emotional issues [1]. And if it
turns out that the health care worker has indeed been
infected by one of these contagions, the serious personal
consequences to that health care worker can include the
postponement of childbearing, damaged personal rela-
tionships, having to alter sexual practices, experiencing
the side effects of prophylactic drugs, chronic disabilities,
loss of employment, denial of worker compensation
claims, possible need for a liver transplant, and premature
death [2].
AIDS, SARS, and the recent epidemics of the avian-flu
have all served to remind us of the occupational risks
faced everyday by HCWs; the result being that the recent
appearance of these diseases has forced this issue onto the
common agenda and helped to spark renewed interest in
the debate over the limits of the moral duty to treat. In
seeking an answer to this question it is useful to have an
understanding of the occupational risks faced by HCWs as
well as an understanding of the attitudes of HCWs to these
risks. For example, studies conducted in various countries
have shown that, especially when there was a risk of being
infected with AIDS, HCWs may refuse to treat a patient on
the grounds that there is a risk of being infected by this
patient [3-11]. And despite the fact that the hepatitis
viruses are transmitted more easily than HIV, it is the fear
of being infected with HIV that causes many HCWs to
experience the greatest amount of stress and anxiety [12].
In a study which compared the relative risks of transmis-
sion of both HBV and HIV, the reasons for physicians'
underlying fears of particular contagions were also inves-
tigated and described. [13]. According to the study, people
initially percieve the risk to be greater when there is a high
likelihood of death involved with infection (as with HIV)
even though there may be less risk of infection, as
opposed to when there is a higher risk of infection but a
lower risk of death involved with that infection (as with
HBV). Additionally, since the likelihood of sexually trans-
mitting HBV between heterosexual partners is less than
that of transmitting HIV, the consequences of HBV infec-
tion are again percieved to be less severe than the conse-
quences of HIV infection. In this way, the hazards posed
by HBV infection conflict less with the obligation to pro-
tect family members from harm. It was also found to be
important that there is less of a stigma attached to having
HBV than there is to having HIV. And, finally, the fact that
there is a vaccine for HBV infection, which is more than 90
percent effective (for vaccinated HCWs the risk of death
from infection is reduced by a factor of nearly twenty),
also was found to greatly influence the perceptions of the
physicians.
Additionally, factors other than a fear of the contagion can
contribute to the reluctance to treat a particular patient.
Some physicians and dentists express concern that if it is
discovered that they treat patients with AIDS, then those
patients who don't have HIV may shun their practice. Still,
other physicians insist they do not know enough about
HIV infection and are too busy to learn [14]. Another rea-
son for which a physician may refuse to treat HIV-positive
patients is that the physician feels they have a duty to pro-
tect their other patients, basing their reasoning on the
principle of "First do not harm". By treating HIV-positive
patients they claim that they may potentially be putting
their other patients at risk for infection [15]. Furthermore,
as has been reported, there is always the possibility that
when a HCW is able to reject the patient based on a more
benign excuse, for example if the patient does not have
enough money, it is even easier, and all the more likely,
for treatment to be refused, even though this refusal was
done in the interest of protecting the physical health of
the individual health care provider [14].
Theoretical framework for the duty to treat
In the literature, most studies have concentrated primarily
on the attitudes and rationale behind the refusal to treat.
Before one can set out to effectively explore the attitudes
of HCWs however, it is important to first consider the
question of whether or not the "duty to treat" might be
subject to contextual constraints, such as providing health
care to a patient suffering from an infectious disease
which may be particularly contagious or for which ade-
quate treatment measures may not yet be available.BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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Clark, in his article about physicians' duty to treat,
claimed that there are three reasons in which such a duty
is grounded [16]:
"... since the ability to render aid is greater, the obliga-
tion to assist is (...) elevated. Second, by consideration
of Daniels' argument that by freely joining a profes-
sion designed to combat disease, one consents to
some standard of risk, and third, by realizing that the
profession has flourished due to socially negotiated
promises to be available in such times of duress."
In his article "Duty to treat or right to refuse", Daniels
argues that when a person chooses a career in a particular
profession, it must be understood by all parties that this
individual has both accepted and is willing to take the
risks that are inherent to that profession [14]:
"Consent is crucial where obligations to take risks exist
in various occupations or professions. For example,
we assume that in choosing their careers, undergoing
the training involved, and agreeing to follow the codes
and practices regulating their work, firefighters and
police have given consent to facing the significant risks
they are obliged to take. There are strong parallels to
medicine. People who enter medical fields clearly had
alternatives. There is a general understanding that phy-
sicians face an increased risk of contagion from dis-
ease, an understanding refined during schooling and
training."
Daniels proposes, however, that some situations can
exceed the standard level of risk (SLR) [14]:
"For example, it is common to screen new house staff
and nurses in medical centers to determine whether
any individuals face special risks of contagion, such as
immunosuppression or pregnancy. Those at high risk
may then be asked to avoid certain treatment situa-
tions, materials, or hospital areas.(...) Protecting
immunosuppressed providers is reasonable "risk
management", a measure taken to reduce bad out-
comes. But such special protection supports the claim
that only standard risks are included in the duty to
treat.(...) Some nosocomial risks clearly take us
beyond what duty requires."
It is perhaps more illustrative if this argument (from this
point on, this statement will simply be referred to as the
"presumed consent") is written in classic form:
Premise 1
Health care services should be provided to patients who
have a contagious disease.
Premise 2
Contracting an infectious disease while providing health
care services to a patient with a contagious disease is an
occupational risk.
Premise 3
It is generally assumed that by joining the health care pro-
fession physicians have given their consent to be exposed
to an increased risk of disease contagion. This assumption
is based on the following facts:
a. There is a general understanding that physicians face an
increased risk of contagion from disease, an understand-
ing refined during schooling and training.
b. People who enter medical fields clearly had alterna-
tives.
Premise 4
Some nosocomial risks clearly take us beyond what duty
requires.
Conclusion
There is a moral duty to treat patients who have a conta-
gious disease so long as the risk to the HCW is below the
SLR.
If we are to accept this argument, then the pressing ques-
tion becomes how to determine and define the risks
which are deemed to be standard and acceptable versus
those which are believed to exceed and, indeed, outweigh
the duty of the health care provider to treat. In order to
begin to answer this question, it will be useful to investi-
gate the nature of the choice (and all that goes along with
making it) that an individual makes when they decide to
enter a particular profession. For instance, how wise is it
to assume that at the time of choosing their future profes-
sion the HCW was fully aware of the risks involved with
such work? Perhaps they were not made aware of the risks
until their education and training. Furthermore, if they
were aware of, and fully appreciated, the risks prior to
deciding on a particular profession, would they have even
chosen that profession in the first place? And, finally, how
is the SLR to be determined, and which of the infectious
diseases would then exceed this SLR? In order to effec-
tively analyze the presumed consent argument it is neces-
sary to have an awareness of the diverse opinions and
beliefs of HCWs and, also, to understand their different
motives and backgrounds. Additionally, knowledge of
what HCWs feel about the risk concept and of how they
feel about their duty to treat patients with contagious dis-
eases can also be of great value to educators as they plan
their curricula and it can be used by the authorities in
charge of health care systems in order to better organize
their services. The purpose of this study was to analyzeBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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whether or not the third premise grounds the duty to treat,
namely, "it is generally assumed that by joining the health
care profession physicians have given their consent to be
exposed to an increased risk of disease contagion". In
order to carry out this analysis, the opinions and beliefs of
physicians and dentists regarding the occupational risks of
infectious diseases were investigated; and, by extension,
the argument that the notion of "presumed consent" may
be grounds for supporting the HCWs' duty to treat was
also analyzed.
Methods
For this cross-sectional survey, the study population was
selected from among physicians and dentists in Ankara,
the capital of Turkey. A self-administered questionnaire
designed to assess the beliefs and opinions of the partici-
pants regarding the occupational risks of infectious dis-
eases was used. This questionnaire was also used to obtain
the socio-demographic information of the participants.
The 17 items on the questionnaire were developed by
reviewing previous studies in the literature [1,3-10]. A
draft of the questionnaire was distributed to experienced
health care professionals and later revised based on their
criticism and suggestions.
In both of the universities in which this study was con-
ducted there are ethics committees which had been estab-
lished for the purpose of determining the ethical
appropriateness of pharmaceutical trials using humans;
since our study involved only the use of a questionnaire
and not an experimental drug, we did not apply for
approval from either of these ethics committees. Instead,
written permission to carry out the study was granted by
the dean of the faculty of medicine and by the chief man-
ager of university hospitals. In addition, all of the poten-
tial participants were fully informed about the aim and
structure of the study. Furthermore, potential volunteers
were all made aware that participation was strictly volun-
tary and that all of the answers they provide would be
done so anonymously.
The questionnaire was administered to a total of 373
health care workers: all of the 236 physicians who work in
surgical specialties at the Ankara University Ibn-i Sina
Hospital and to all of the 137 dentists in the Gazi Univer-
sity Faculty of Dentistry. Dentists were included in this
study because, aside from being HCWs themselves, there
are a number of studies in the literature which show that
dentists, citing various reasons, may also refuse to treat
patients with contagious diseases. And, in order to better
assess the fact on which the third premise of presumed
consent is based, we decided to include only professional
health care workers, instead of students and others who
might still be in the process of deciding whether or not to
currently enter the field.
In total there were 230 participants, 101 physicians and
129 dentists, who completed the questionnaire, for an
overall response rate of 61.7%. The questionnaire was
later sent back to the non-respondents one month after
the first survey, and 28 of these were completed and
returned to us. The mean age of the participants was 33.8
± 9.6 years, while 56.5% were male and 43.5% were
female. Additionally, the average amount of time that
they had been working in the medical profession was
found to be 8.5 years (min. 0, max. 40). All of the data was
collected anonymously. The difference between the two
groups, physicians and dentists, was compared using the
chi-square test, with a p-value of <0.05 accepted as statis-
tically significant. All analyses were carried out using SPSS
11.5.
Results
Of the HCWs surveyed in this study, roughly half stated
that they understood that by choosing their profession
they would be exposing themselves to an increased risk of
contracting contagious disease (55.2%). And at the time
of entering the faculty, 24.4% of the participants
expressed that they were unaware of any increased risks;
however, they later learned of these risks during their edu-
cation and training. In other words, 79.6% of the partici-
pants stated that they had known about the risks either at
the time they chose their profession or that they had later
learned of the risks during their training and education.
Additionally, 6.5% of the participants answered that they
had only come to realize the kinds of risks they would face
after starting to work. The percentage of participants who
claimed that if they had been aware of the risks earlier they
would not have chosen to enter or continue in the medi-
cal profession was 5.2%.
Listed in Table 1 are statements which physicians and
dentists chose as best reflecting their personal opinions
regarding the occupational risks of infectious disease. In
general, the physicians, prior to their education and train-
ing, were significantly more aware of the potential risks
associated with their profession than were the dentists (p
< 0.05). A significantly higher percentage of the dentists
however, stated that they only learned of the occupational
risks of dentistry during their education and training (p <
0.05). There was no statistically significant difference
between the two groups in terms of the other opinions
questioned.
The participants were also asked whether or not they agree
with the argument "When people choose, and continue to
practice, the medical or dentistry profession, they are then
required to accept all of the occupational risks resulting
from the infectious diseases they might confront". The
aim of this question was to determine whether or not the
HCWs each have their own individual working-definitionBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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for the SLR. Of the participants, 57.4% believed that there
is such a level. 52.2% felt that certain diseases would
exceed the level of acceptable risk unless specific protec-
tive measures were implemented, and 5.2% said that
some diseases were always beyond the SLR, no matter
what precautions might be taken. No statistically signifi-
cant difference was found between the physicians and the
dentists.
Listed in Table 2 are the diseases which, under certain cir-
cumstances, were cited as potentially exceeding the SLR.
Among the participants who stated that there would be a
SLR for providing health care to the patients of specific
diseases unless protective measures were implemented,
AIDS and Hepatitis C and B were the most frequently cited
of these diseases (71.7%, 64.2%, and 56.7%, respec-
tively). The participants who felt that some diseases
would always exceed a SLR expressed, that Hepatitis B,
Tuberculosis, and Bacterial meningitis always would go
beyond the SLR (41.7%, same for all). According to these
participants, the occupational risk of potentially being
infected with HIV is paramount to all other risks. Percent-
age-wise, AIDS was the most frequently mentioned dis-
ease that would exceed the SLR, more so than SARS.
All of the participants who answered that some diseases
would be beyond the SLR were then asked what criteria
they used to make their determination. The most com-
monly expressed criteria, in order, regarding the diseases,
were the likelihood of transmission, whether or not pro-
tective measures are available, and whether or not immu-
nization is possible (66.7%, 65.2%, and 58.3%,
respectively). The distribution of these criteria among the
physicians and dentists can be seen in Table 3. Physicians
expressed significantly more often than dentists that if
there was no immunization or treatment available for a
particular disease, then that disease would exceed the SLR
(p < 0.01). In terms of other criteria, there were no signif-
icant differences observed between the two groups.
Discussion
The primary aim of this paper is to evaluate the claim that
presumed consent may constitute grounds for the moral
duty to treat. The presumed consent argument is valid,
because its conclusion should logically be accepted if its
premises are taken into account. To analyze the soundness
of the argument we carried out a survey investigating the
opinions of HCWs about the occupational risks of infec-
tious diseases. In total, 79.6% of the participants said that
they either had some degree of knowledge about the risks
when they chose their profession or that they learned of
the risks later during their education and training. In other
words, one fifth of the participants either lacked adequate
knowledge about the occupational risks when they chose
their profession or were not sufficiently informed of these
risks during their faculty education and training. This
Table 1: Opinions of the participants regarding the occupational risks of infectious diseases (%)
Physicians (n:101) Dentists (n:129)
1 When I entered the faculty I knew that I would be at an increased risk for exposure to infectious 
diseases because of my chosen profession.
63.4* 48.8
2 I might not have chosen this profession, if these risks had been thoroughly explained to me before I 
entered the faculty.
1.0 4.7
3 I did not know that I would be at an increased risk for exposure to infectious disease when I entered 
the faculty. However, I later learned of these risks during my education and training.
16.8 30.2*
4 I might not have chosen this profession, if these risks had been thoroughly explained to me during my 
education and training.
1.0 3.1
5 I only came to understand what kind of risks I would be exposed to when I started to work after 
graduation.
7.9 5.4
* p < 0.05
Table 2: The diseases regarded as exceeding the SLR (%)
If there are no protective measures available, some 
diseases below would exceed the SLR (n:120)
Some diseases below always exceed the SLR (n:12)
AIDS 71.7 75.0
Hepatitis C 64.2 58.3
Hepatitis B 56.7 41.7
SARS 52.5 66.7
Tuberculosis 35.0 41.7
Bacterial meningitis 34.2 41.7BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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means that the assumption stated in Premise 3 may be
wrong for an important proportion of health care work-
ers. It seems reasonable to suggest that the words "there is
a general understanding" would be misleading if used to
characterize a social concept of which the applicability
and, indeed, the very existence, are yet to be established by
sociological studies.
It is also useful to discuss the other problems associated
with presumed consent; in particular, the difficulty of
choosing a profession autonomously, the constant level
of uncertainty present in the medical profession, the near-
impossibility of being able to evaluate, in retrospect,
whether or not every individual was informed, and the
seemingly inescapable problem that this practice would
legitimize, and perhaps even foster, discrimination
against patients with certain diseases.
Requisites for the presumed consent argument
If we are to use the presumed consent argument, then the
findings of this study indicate that when a new epidemic
of a contagious disease occurs, or when the medical pro-
fession is confronted with a disease for which no immu-
nization or treatment options are available, some HCWs
are not bound by the duty to treat according to the pre-
sumed consent argument. This seems potentially prob-
lematic and demands serious consideration. How
appropriate is it to describe the healthcare provider's
responsibility and duty as stemming from their 'consent'?
To address this question, it is helpful to reflect on the con-
ditions required for an individual to be able to give con-
sent that is well-informed.
For an HCW's consent to be informed, the following
should first be explained to them: (a) the risk posed by
each of the contagious diseases known at that given time,
(b) commonly agreed criteria and definitions of situations
that would surpass the SLR, and (c) the fact that there will
always be a degree of uncertainty involved with working
in the medical profession, as new risks may emerge at any
point during one's professional life. If not necessarily
when they choose their profession, then at least after
being given the relevant knowledge during education and
training, the person's choice should be regarded as
informed. It should therefore be ensured that HCWs are
acquainted with each new and emerging risk, and with
any methods of prevention developed during or after their
education and training. If a person's choice is to be confi-
dently regarded as informed, it is imperative that these
conditions be met. Of course, the question now becomes:
how possible is it to satisfy all these conditions?
Choosing a profession: how autonomous can it be?
How autonomous is an individual's choice of profession?
It is quite easy to imagine more than one answer to this
question, but one thing is for sure: any thoughtful answer
would acknowledge that choice is determined both by fac-
tors that are under the control of the individual and by
factors that are not. Personal factors such as educational
status, perception of the world and ambitions all influ-
ence an individual's choice of profession strongly. Never-
theless, factors outside the individual's control also play a
large role in determining that choice. The environment in
which the person grew up – their family life, the jobs of
their parents, their community, social class and culture –
all contribute to forming that individual's background,
which (needless to say) has a very large influence on the
opportunities and choices available to them.
Even though a person may not have been sufficiently
informed when they chose their profession, it can be
argued that during their education and training they will
learn all relevant knowledge about the occupational risks
associated with working in the medical profession. If so, it
is fair to assume that when this individual begins to work
after graduation they will be willing to confront any of
those risks. In theory at least, it can be presumed that every
student who passes their exams and goes on to graduate
from the faculty is informed of the risks; so it can be
argued that all HCWs who are currently active in their pro-
fession have consented to accept the risks posed by all the
contagious diseases known at the time of their graduation.
Of course, the diverse factors that determine the quality of
education, such as the particular educational methods
Table 3: Frequency of criteria used to determine whether a particular disease is below the SLR
Physicians (n:55) Dentists (n:77)
Whether specific immunization is available 72.7* 48.1
Whether protective measures are available 69.1 62.3
Probability of transmission 63.6 68.8
Probability of cure 54.5* 29.9
The mechanism of disease transmission 49.1 49.4
The mortality rate of the disease 38.2 46.8
Prevalence of the disease in the general population 25.5 22.1
The social (stigmatic and discriminatory) impact of the disease 14.5 14.3
* p < 0.01BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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used, the course content, the abilities and knowledge of
the instructors, role-models, and the personal features and
motivations of students, are all potential sources of varia-
tion. But for the sake of argument, let us assume that a
standardized education program is implemented
throughout all medical schools. If that were the situation,
then the argument that the individual has been made
aware of the occupational risks during education would
be true to the extent that the education program addressed
those risks sufficiently. Nevertheless, it would be hard to
claim that presumed consent is valid for every individual.
For many people, a degree in medicine is very costly, both
financially and in terms of time and energy. Under such
circumstances, it is difficult for a person to quit their
schooling despite the awareness they gain of the occupa-
tional risks involved. Individuals might feel pressured and
confused by the two options confronting them: on the
one hand, dropping out of medicine and forfeiting all the
time, effort and money spent on schooling towards that
aim; and on the other, reluctantly accepting the occupa-
tional risks, which may look frightening to the individual
at that moment. Of course, it is important to remember
that the person chose the medical profession in the first
place, and numerous positive and beneficial elements are
associated with working within it, which may ultimately
serve to temper and override the individual's fear of the
risks. An additional source of pressure may be that, for
whatever reasons, switching educational tracks is too dif-
ficult; it may appear too daunting or be financially unten-
able. It seems likely that in the end the individual will
choose to continue with their education and embark on a
career in medicine, despite hesitation and fear of the risks.
It is difficult to describe a decision made under conditions
of such uncertainty and stress as 'informed'.
As can be seen, we do not choose our profession from
among a wide array of possibilities spread out in front of
us by thoroughly researching each one so that we are fully
informed of its nature; everybody's options are different
and it is a large and difficult task to make oneself suffi-
ciently informed of them. Moreover, as described above,
the decision to quit medical school can be quite difficult:
on one side of the dilemma there are occupational risks
that must be accepted regardless of misgivings on the part
of the individual; on the other side, very influential factors
pressure the individual to continue their medical educa-
tion. Thus, the claim that "People who enter medical
fields clearly had alternatives" is debatable and sometimes
even doubtful. In theory it sounds right; nobody has to be
a physician. But in practice, having alternatives does not
mean that all our decisions are made freely or autono-
mously.
Uncertainty in medical professions
Theoretically, the fundamental problem with the pre-
sumed consent argument is that it cannot explain why
there is always some degree of uncertainty about the occu-
pational risks of working in the medical profession, par-
ticularly stemming from new and emerging diseases.
Quite simply, if there was little or no knowledge of a risk
at the time the individual became informed and gave their
(tacit) consent, then this individual never accepted the
risk, implicitly or otherwise, because it was unknown at
the time the individual was informed. From a historical
perspective, it is possible to see that while the medical
profession was once concerned only with treating dis-
eases, its vocational responsibility came in time to include
preventative, promotive and rehabilitative healthcare
services. As the notions of human rights and patient rights
have developed and become widespread, perceptions
about the health profession have changed at the commu-
nity level. Diseases that once killed millions of people can
now be treated with a simple medicament, but today we
are faced with new and challenging diseases unheard of in
the past. As a result, the continuous cycle of change –
spurred on by greater knowledge and technological
advances and confrontations with new and untreatable
diseases – serves to alter the identity and nature of the
medical profession, and out of all this arises a constant
degree of uncertainty. This characteristic uncertainty is
present both when the individual chooses the profession
and throughout their education and training period –
and, indeed, for the entirety of their professional career. It
is therefore not possible for someone to be fully informed
when they choose their profession, nor is it possible for
them to become fully informed during their education
and training; nevertheless, the person should be informed
about the uncertainty involved with working in the med-
ical profession. In the light of this uncertainty, answers
such as "if I had known I would not have chosen it" are
not very meaningful, because there is no way to anticipate
all the potential risks one might encounter in the course
of a professional life. The only sure thing amid the uncer-
tainty is that diseases such as SARS and avian 'flu will
always continue to emerge.
Practical concerns
So far in the discussion, the difficulties of satisfying the
conditions needed to validate the presumed consent argu-
ment have been described. It seems virtually impossible to
fulfill all these conditions satisfactorily. At this point it is
important to discuss two particular problems regarding
the argument itself.
First, it seems nearly impossible to evaluate individually
whether the choice made by every HCW to enter the med-
ical profession was informed. The only way to do that
would be laboriously to ask each HCW whether they wereBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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informed when they decided on the health care profes-
sion. Even then, irrespective of whether the person's
answer to this question reflects the truth, the only thing
that could be learned from such a broad and extensive
interrogation would be the individual's perception, not
their actual knowledge. By extension, we could not ques-
tion the participants' level of knowledge in this study, but
rather how they perceive their level of knowledge. Because
it is futile to seek objectivity in people's perceptions, it
would not be sound to use those perceptions to determine
whether the HCW's choice was informed, and thus
whether they have taken on the duty to treat. And if these
perceptions are regarded as subjective, as they should be,
then it would be very difficult to develop a set of standard
criteria that could be used to establish whether a HCW has
been informed. This would also complicate efforts to
reach a consensus on forming criteria by which various
levels of risk could be defined universally. Unfortunately,
such difficulties can only hamper efforts to protect the
right of every patient to receive the best treatment availa-
ble.
The second problem is that there is very likely to be more
discrimination against patients with certain diseases, as
HCWs use this argument to justify their refusal to treat
those diseases. The World Medical Association's Declara-
tion of Geneva, which states the basic moral values of the
medical profession, specifies that there should be no dis-
crimination, regardless of the circumstances: "I will not
permit considerations of age, disease or disability, creed,
ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political affiliation,
race, sexual orientation, or social standing to intervene
between my duty and my patient" [17]. However, the phy-
sicians' right to choose their patients is described by the
same organization in another policy called "Twelve Prin-
ciples of Provision of Health Care in any National Health
Care System" [18]: "Any health care system should allow
the patient to consult the physician of his choice, and the
physician to treat only patients of his choice, without the
rights of either being affected in any way." For regulations
at the national level, it is generally held that if there is an
urgent need for medical care [19,20], or if no other physi-
cian is available to whom the patient can apply [21,22],
this right would be negated and the available physician
must treat the patient. If we look at these obligations in
reverse, we can see that the physician might refuse to pro-
vide health services to the patient if there is no urgent
need for medical care and/or if another physician is
around to whom the patient can be referred. Besides, the
physician might also refuse the patient on the grounds
that their prejudices may adversely affect the advice or
treatment that they provide [20]. In actuality, this flexibil-
ity was written into the regulations in order to ensure that
the patient receives the highest quality care possible; but
as can be seen, it could also be abused. And if the presence
or absence of consent is used as a criterion to define the
duty to treat, in addition the existing flexibilities, then a
mechanism would be created by which HCWs may freely,
and perhaps excessively, discriminate among patients.
To summarize, considering all the points discussed above,
the soundness of the presumed consent argument can be
doubted. Therefore, it should not be claimed that there is
a duty to treat on the basis of the presumed consent argu-
ment, as the argument itself is not persuasive.
It is also important to note that 5.2% of our participants
said that they would not have chosen this profession if
they had been informed of the risks. In other words, most
of those HCWs who claimed that they were uninformed
of the occupational risks when they entered the faculty, or
were not fully informed of them during their education
period, stated that they still would have chosen the medi-
cal profession even if they had been more aware of the
risks. This finding tells us that, generally speaking, HCWs
place relatively little importance on being informed
beforehand. Further support for these findings comes
from the answers given by the participants to the other
questions. Nearly half said that there is no SLR, and the
other half felt that the diseases they evaluate would not
surpass SLR if the appropriate protective measures are
available. Also, Table 2 indicates that at least 28.3% of the
participants thought that none of the diseases listed in
that table would exceed the SLR regardless of circum-
stances. It can therefore be concluded that a large majority
of the HCWs place more emphasis on their working con-
ditions than on being informed beforehand. In addition,
the criteria most commonly stated by the participants for
determining the SLR were the likelihood of transmission
of a disease, whether protective measures are available
and whether immunization is possible. Each of these cri-
teria is related to protecting the HCW from infection, not
to the treatment or the effects of a particular disease. This
means that as long as protective measures are available,
the HCWs would regard a given disease as below the SLR,
so it has nothing to do with being informed beforehand.
Besides, the only disease used as an example in this study
that could be claimed to exceed the SLR was SARS; AIDS,
hepatitis C, hepatitis B, tuberculosis and bacterial menin-
gitis all fell below the SLR according to these criteria. Nev-
ertheless, only 30.9% of the participants suggested that
SARS would surpass the SLR. To put this into perspective,
SARS was not even observed until 2003, and the research
in the present study was conducted in 2004 and 2005.
Therefore, most participants in this study were not aware
of SARS when they chose the medical profession, nor were
they ever informed of it during education or training. They
nonetheless felt that the duty to treat pertained even to
patients with SARS. All of this suggests that factors more
useful and relevant than presumed consent influence theBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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decision of HCWs to choose and continue in the medical
profession; these factors may include the social contract
between society and the medical profession, and the
greater ability of HCWs to provide medical care [16]. It is
these factors that should be investigated and emphasized
when defining a moral duty to treat.
This study could be limited by several factors. The first
limitation could be due to a socially desirable response
bias; some participants might have given what they per-
ceived as the 'right' answers to the questions rather than
the answers that reflect their opinion or belief. In order to
address this concern, future studies could benefit by using
qualitative methods, which provide more reliable results
about the motives and opinions of participants. Also, this
study was not prospective, so recall bias might have
affected the responses of the participants. Furthermore,
the extent to which the results of this study are applicable
to HCWs such as nurses or physicians who work in inter-
nal specialties is uncertain. Future studies that include
other HCWs as participants may broaden our understand-
ing of the beliefs and opinions of HCWs, thereby allowing
us to state our claims and shape our arguments more pre-
cisely. Finally, it should be mentioned that the response
rate for this study (61.7%) was slightly lower than is gen-
erally expected for a survey. Nevertheless, despite all these
methodological limitations, we believe that our findings
support our conclusion about the persuasiveness of the
presumed consent argument.
Conclusion
If we use the presumed consent argument to establish the
duty of the HCW to provide care, we are confronted with
problems ranging over the difficulty of choosing a profes-
sion autonomously, the constant level of uncertainty
present in the medical profession, the near-impossibility
of being able to evaluate retrospectively whether every
individual was informed, and the seemingly inescapable
problem that this practice would legitimize, and perhaps
even foster, discrimination against patients with certain
diseases. Our findings suggest that another problem can
be added to the list: one-fifth of the participants in this
study either lacked adequate knowledge of the occupa-
tional risks when they chose the medical profession or
were not sufficiently informed of these risks during their
faculty education and training. As we stated above, in
order for a candidate HCW to be informed literally, three
items should be explained to them: (a) the risk posed by
each of the contagious diseases known at that given time,
(b) commonly agreed criteria and definitions of situations
that would surpass the SLR, and (c) the fact that there will
always be a degree of uncertainty involved with working
in the medical profession, as new risks may emerge at any
point during one's professional life. In this study it has
been shown that at least some HCWs may not be
informed of (a). Also, it is not currently possible to inform
HCWs of (b) since there are no widely-agreed criteria and
definitions to allow for a universally accepted SLR; and
there is currently no standard education for all HCWs to
ensure that (c) is satisfied. Considering this in addition to
the problems mentioned above, the third premise of the
presumed consent argument appears implausible and,
consequently, the duty to treat cannot be grounded per-
suasively on the consent assumption. It is therefore more
useful to emphasize justifications other than presumed
consent when defining the duty of HCWs to provide care,
such as the social contract between society and the medi-
cal profession and the fact that HCWs have a greater abil-
ity to provide medical aid.
Furthermore, in terms of the moral duty to provide care, it
seems that most HCWs are more concerned about the
availability of protective measures than about whether
they had been informed of a particular risk beforehand. It
seems important that further research be carried out to
improve understanding of the opinions and perceptions
of HCWs and the basis of their definitions, as this infor-
mation could prove very helpful in defining a duty to treat
that can be effectively put into practice. It is also impor-
tant that a well-organized ongoing educational program
that is needs-based and easily accessible be provided to
HCWs at both the graduate and postgraduate levels. In
particular, this program must be continuously updated
regarding AIDS and other diseases that may cause the
HCWs to behave discriminatively towards patients, even
though these diseases are below the SLR. Such continuing
medical education is the best answer to the justification
"When I chose the profession/when I graduated, this dis-
ease did not exist!" for refusing treatment. Emphasizing
the social role of HCWs, and educating them about the
professional obligations derived from the social contract
betweeen the profession and the wider social order,
would further reduce that kind of reasoning. In addition,
stricter standards for the duty to provide care should
established by determining the criteria for a SLR and iden-
tifying the situations and conditions that would exceed
this SLR. Each of these measures could serve to remind
HCWs that they have a moral responsibility, as individual
HCWs, to be aware of professional obligations and to act
as responsible members of the profession. Moreover, the
working environment of HCWs should be provided with
preventative measures that can be applied both generally
and specifically and should emphasize their use. For a cir-
cumstance in which a preventative measure has been
developed for a disease but is not available for treating a
particular case, it would not be easy to justify the claim
that there is an undeniable duty to provide care at that
moment.BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:29 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/29
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As Dr. Singer says: "There is a threshold beyond which
health care workers aren't obliged to take personal risks.
We don't expect firefighters to jump into a burning pit, or
police officers to throw themselves in front of a bullet.
How health care workers define this threshold is an
intensely personal decision. ... But obviously, it has seri-
ous implications for our collective response to a problem
like SARS." [23]. It is clear that to rely upon the presumed
consent argument to define the duty to treat will not make
our collective response to potential epidemics such as
SARS or avian 'flu any more effective or robust.
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Appendix
The questions referred to:
￿ Whether the participant knew when they chose their
profession that they would have an increased risk of being
infected by a contagious disease?
￿ If the participant did not know of this occupational risk,
whether or not they later learned of it during their train-
ing?
￿ If they still have not been formally made aware of the
risks, do they think that they have enough knowledge
about the current risks that they face?
￿ If they had known about the risks earlier, would they
still have chosen this particular profession?
￿ When somebody chooses to be a physician or a dentist,
are they obligated to accept all of the occupational risks
regarding infectious diseases?
￿ If not, what criteria must we use to determine that a par-
ticular disease is below the SLR?
￿ Which diseases are below the SLR?
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